

Tech-resilience in the path towards multipolarity



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
US-China relation: A game of offense and defense

US-China relation remains top of mind




2020

Year-long tension on semi export control ventured to another chapter over past month



As US further extended entity list to non-weapon categories over past years Chinese Additions to US Entity List, by Sector 100% Weapons Telecommunications Technology 70% Aerospace 60% Surveillance 50% 40% ■ Nuclear 30% Chemicals 20% Construction 10% Textiles

Huawei's 5G comeback reignited US attention towards trade restriction




Semis are back in focus with continued expanding restriction by BIS

2019

2018


0%



Chokepoint formed to target tech advancement



The technology of highest strategic importance in each economy, 2023



US-China: a cyclical path with a constant theme



While US-China relation fluctuated, competition + cooperation has been the theme

Cooperation



July 1971

In preparation for a formal visit of Nixon, his National Security advisor Henry Kissinger secretly visited Beijing to produce an agreement on the presidential visit in 1972

1979 - 1990

US-China formally established diplomatic relation to recognize both country's key position and with US transferred diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, both countries entered a "honeymoon" period of multi-front collaboration

2001 - 2009

US-China relation winter ends after the September 11 terrorist attacks as Bush administration calling China a strategic partner in the war on terror and commenced a counterterrorism dialogue. Including pertaining North Korea nuclear program

2009 - 2017

The forming of G-2 (Chimerica) relationship for US and China to work on global problems was suggested during Obama administration, as the two countries expanding strategic economic dialogue with each other

1949 - 1971

Zhou Enlai



Competition

Constant hostility between US and China, with key evidence at the 1954 Geneva Conference when US secretary of state refused to shake hands or contact with Chinese delegation led by

1991 - 2001

Post the resolving of USSR, US-China back to competitive mode with intensified debate over China political system, evident by tension over Taiwan strait during the 1996 presidential election, as well as 1999 Chinese embassy crisis in Belgrade

2018 - 2021

During Trump administration, US-China trade was leveraged as a political instrument with the trade ban and arrest of Huawei's CFO, while both sides moderated with 2018 US-China Phase One trade deal, the Covid-19 outbreak quickly turn the relation south as Trump blamed China on the origin of the global pandemic

2021 - today

Biden administration follows Trump's trade and tech containment policy highlighted with the chip export control, which further expanded post Huawei product launch in Oct. The balloon incident evidenced the lack of trust from both parties, while we have TW and US election ahead in 2024

Road towards a multipolarity world

Admittedly, not only US/China, but all major countries around the world are putting security above economic development



US in Transition: Al, blockchain, and tech re-shoring

Tech resilience in full display this year

Jul-23



Technology stocks have climbed this year despite the impact of rising rates

NASDAQ 100 ytd performance relative to S&P 500 equal weighted NASDAQ 100 vs S&P 500 Equal Weighted 140 NDX index peak 135 130 125

10y UST yields rose 108 bps 115 110

May-23


105

Jan-23

Mar-23




The S&P 500 12-month forward P/E has increased despite an increase in yields



The year of generative AI, or just the beginning?



Market focus turning from infrastructure towards application, but pricing is the key



Blockchain/crypto: light at the end of tunnel?




Stable coins leading tokenization with payments/funds adoption

The crypto cycle: convergence of utility, scalability and regulatory clarity driven rerating




While institutional adoption and capital inflow helped to increase AUM and transforming crypto to a real industry



Re-shoring supply chain: a costly process



Trillion-dollar level of spending is required for complete de-risking of int'l supply chain





China in Transition: when and how would the rebound happen?

Chinese equities are cheap, and market knows it...




P/E at trough across sectors vs past 5 years regardless of difference in fundamentals

Valuation trends towards Nov 22' trough when covid-zero still hold



MSCI comparison to Nifty50 shew expanding gap since 2022



...as there's still unresolved concerns over long-term GA




2023 marks the start of China transiting to the "new norm" while everyone still adapting

De-risk supply chain

Continued de-risking of supply chains away from China would mean slower FDI flows and reduced productivity spillovers

China's PPI year-over-year breakdown



Spillover to consumption


Demand deficiency and deflationary pressure emanating from deleveraging in the property sector and LGFVs

Deglobalization_ Demography **Deflation** Deleveraging

Elderly society

China sees rising age dependency ratio amid decelerating growth of working age population.

Projected change in working-age population between 2020 and 2035



Debt to GDP


China's debt to GDP towards 298% in 2023 (behind Japan and France), while central government debt to GDP ratio only at ~20%


Solutions? State leverage + private sector growth



Reaching the Nash equilibrium between government and civilians


NPC Standing Committee approved a mid-year expansion to the Central budget in mid-Oct, the first time since 1998





Nowadays, China's private enterprises contribute 60% of GDP, 60% of tax income, 70% of total investments and 80% of urban employment

Private firms' share % among China's largest 100 listed firms by mkt cap



China's export is increasingly driven by private enterprises, setting up factories/stores/R&D centers overseas and rebuilding global supply chains






Friend-shoring: Investment opportunities across Asia


Not a decoupling scenario feared by market




Instead, a slowdown of globalization while supply chain readjust to such changes in focus










Notably, China has been bypassing such restriction through intermediate export with Asian emerging markets




Likely beneficiaries in US-China rivalry



Mexico, India, Vietnam could be key of nearshoring and friend-shoring beneficiaries

Frequently mentioned nearshoring candidates by the US and LATAM analysts as of 2022



US companies likely need several geographic options to replicate the scale of China





Thank you



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